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ureau, Rivera and many others might be wo-
rried, but I think that a lot of other colleagues 
are silently quite pleased: -Why bother with 
these awkward probabilities when the public 
doesn’t want them?
It reflects an attitude that probability forecasting is some-
thing that since 1992 has been forced upon the meteorologi-
cal community through the launch of the ensemble predic-
tion system (ENS). But probability forecasting has old roots 
in forecasting meteorology since the early 1900’s when it was 
championed by the American Clement Abbe and the Swede 
Anders Ångström among others. It does not work in isolation 
from deterministic forecasting, but is linked to it in a mathe-
matically, operationally and psychologically consistent way.
In this article I will discuss why the meteorological com-
munity obviously has problems with probabilities. It has led to 
a situation where many meteorologists on one hand, knowing 
what is “politically correct” endorses the use of probabilities 
,but on the other hand try to evade the use of it by different 
forms of quasi-deterministic approaches. 
I will in this article suggest, from my own experiences, 
that problems with probabilities in forecasting meteorology 
is part of a wider problem of accommodating statistical con-
cepts. The conclusion is that the meteorological community 
cannot “wish away” probabilities or forecast uncertainties. 
To remedy the situation I will at the end suggest a layout to 
a statistical “training course” for meteorologists. 
1. My development as a 
weather forecaster
When I came into weather forecasting in the late 1960’s 
we relied on “synoptic experience” underpinned by the “Ber-
gen School” frontal theory and to some degree the “Chicago 
School” theories about planetary waves. We were supposed 
to tell the public and special customers in great detail in time 
and space “how the weather is going to be”.  
When after 5-6 years as an “Assistant Forecaster” I be-
came a “Senior Forecaster” I started to question the prevai-
ling deterministic forecast culture. During a visit to the UK 
Met Office in 1975 I learned that one way to deal with fore-
cast uncertainty was just to limit the forecast information. 
It made the message easier to understand, remember and in-
terpret. As I later found out, filtering out less predictable de-
tails also improved the forecast quality and minimized the 
forecast “jumpiness”. 
These less predictable scales might, however, contain im-
portant information. By leaving those out we run the risk of 
throwing out the baby with the water. The solution was to 
use probabilities. 
As aviation forecaster at Gothenburg and Malmö airports 
I had become acquainted with the Terminal Aerodrome Fo-
recast (TAF). Its code with deterministic parts, complemen-
ted with probabilistic parts, provided an excellent and ba-
lanced way to communicate weather forecast information. 
Probabilities were, however, at that time among meteo-
rologists mainly regarded as a way to “cover one’s back”. My 
colleagues at Malmö airport used to tease one of our colle-
agues, Torsten, for doing “elastic forecasts” with TEMPO or 
PROBs for stratus and/or bad visibility in situations when 
they went for CAVOK (Ceiling and visibility OK). But it didn’t 
take long to realise that on a flatland 72 m above the sea le-
vel and close to the Danish sounds, TEMPO and PROB for 
stratus or low visibility was the name of the game. The pi-
lots didn’t mind Torsten’s forecasts, on the contrary; when he 
could confidently promise CAVOK they could really trust him.
Scepticism about probabilities also prevailed at the Cen-
tral Forecast Office at SMHI. However, one of my colleagues 
with wide views, Erik Liljas, thought otherwise and brought 
in the American meteorologists and statistician Alan Murphy 
as a consultant. From his lectures and papers we learned that 
uncertainty forecasts, in particular expressed as probabili-
ties, served as valuable additional forecast information. Ins-
tead of pretending that we made exact and perfect forecasts, 
it was a better strategy to admit our forecast uncertainty and 
try to estimate the degree of uncertainty.
But if uncertainty information, and in particular probabi-
lities, are valuable additional information, why don’t people 
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ask for them? And why are many meteorologists not unhappy 
about the current state of affairs? To answer these questions 
we must look into a) the attitude of the public to uncertainty 
information, b) the role of statistics in forecasting meteoro-
logy and c) the history of ensemble forecasting.
2. The public’s urge for 
categorical answers
It is almost an uncontested belief in the meteorological 
community that “the public doesn’t understand probabili-
ties”. I am not so sure. When we launched the ENS in 1992 
at ECMWF the most devoted supporter of probability fore-
cast was our “chef du cuisine” in the staff restaurant. He was 
daily commuting in his car between Reading and Basings-
toke and listened in to Radio Berkshire’s probability forecasts 
of slippery roads. He had over the years learnt to relate the 
probabilities to his own experiences of the road conditions. 
But it is true; a majority of the public and many customers 
want deterministic forecasts. The main reason for this is, I 
believe, that they want us meteorologists to make the deci-
sion for them. A probability forecast such as “25% probabili-
ty of >10 mm/12h” would force them to make their own de-
cision and there would be nobody to blame if it was wrong. 
In cases of bad forecasts, we serve as scapegoats and are por-
trayed as incompetent idiots. But it is just a ceremonial to re-
direct the blame from the decision makers. If we really were 
incompetent, then we would of course have been replaced. 
Instead, are silently “rehabilitated” to serve as sacrifice lam-
bs for the next serious weather event.
But are we left to choose between a Scylla of easily un-
derstood popular deterministic forecasting and a Charybdis 
of tricky and unpopular probability forecasting”? In summer 
1986, July 5, when I watched the BBC weather a Third Way 
seemed to open up. 
On the screen was the Chief BBC Forecaster, Bill Giles, dis-
cussing the uncertainty of a developing cyclone over the Bay 
of Biscay. He told us why the developing storm could move 
into southern England, but also why it could take a track over 
northern France. It struck me when I watched this “how cle-
ver he is”. He had managed to turn a potential weakness, not 
knowing exactly what would happen, into strength. If we fo-
recasters have the opportunity to present uncertain weather 
situations in honest ways, we get a chance to demonstrate 
our meteorological knowledge and experience. 
I have since then during my years in Britain seen this 
“trick” demonstrated by the BBC forecasters several times. 
The most drastic case occurred in mid-December 2011. The 
approaching Atlantic storm was very unpredictable with lar-
ge spread in the ensembles and the deterministic NWP mo-
dels changing drastically from one run to the next. In one 
computer run there was no storm at all! All in all, nobody 
really knew if and where Britain would be hit by flooding, 
snow or gales.
Instead of taking a lay-back attitude and blame the “un-
reliable computer” the BBC forecasters, guided by the Met 
Office, acknowledged the great uncertainties and presented 
the situation as it evolved in honest professional ways. This 
highly impressed not only the British public but rendered the 
forecasters appreciation from the Met Office and BBC mana-
gements and even from the UK Government. Their presenta-
tions so cleverly turned their weakness into strength that few 
noticed that the public never were given a categorical “what 
will happen” weather forecast until the very last moment!
Uncertainties, presented in the right professional way will 
offer opportunities to the forecasters to enhance their profes-
sional standing – providing they break with some ingrained 
attitudes to statistical thinking.
3. The role of statistics in 
forecasting meteorology
Statistical methods were for long times seen as equally 
powerful as dynamical methods in weather forecasting.  A 
comparison between the two approaches, led by Edward Lo-
renz in the late 1950’s, was essentially a draw. However, with 
the increasing computer power the dynamic methods displa-
yed more potential for improvement than the statistical. Sta-
tistics would thereafter serve as a secondary, but still impor-
tant support to NWP. 
Sweden was at that time, together with the US and UK, 
pioneering numerical weather prediction (NWP) but the fo-
recast quality was still fairly low. These were the days of the 
quasi-geostrophic models and their construction restricted 
their ability to forecast extreme weather conditions. But we 
could see how the NWP slowly got better and better.
 
3.1 forecast verification
With the increasing success of the NWP the modellers be-
came excessively confident and started to spread the word 
that “in 5-10 years we do not need any forecasters”1. This, of 
course, created an animosity between them and the forecas-
ters, which has lasted to our days. In their infighting both 
sides used verification statistics to argue their case. The fo-
recast verifications at the meteorological institutes were the-
refore rarely conducted by an independent unit. 
However, both sides had problems with the interpreta-
tions of the verifications which rarely showed their forecasts 
to be as “good” as perceived. Attempts to “sex up” poor sta-
tistical results were compensated by their inabilities to make 
correct interpretations. The mathematical simplicity of most 
verification scores may give an impression that the interpre-
1 When I heard this for the first time in 1966, at the start of my meteorological education, I decided not to believe in it. Much later, during research into the his-
tory of NWP, I found evidence that it had been a political ploy to secure funding. The money providing authorities were not as much impressed by promises of 
“better” weather forecasts, as with “cheaper” forecasts.
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tations will also be simple. That is not generally the case. Du-
ring my time at ECMWF we coined the phrase: “What looks 
good might be bad, what looks bad might be good”. 
3.2 statistical interPretation
From forecast verification there is only a small step to co-
rrection of systematic forecast errors. During the 1970’s the 
model independent Perfect Prog Method (PPM) was repla-
ced by the model dependent linear regression Model Output 
Statistics (MOS). One of the best overviews of these methods 
is found in the proceedings of the September 1982 ECMWF 
Seminar on Interpretation of Numerical Weather Prediction 
Products, http://www.ecmwf.int/publications/library/do/re-
ferences/list/1616
When I arrived at the ECMWF half a year later I found a 
great animosity against statistical interpretation, in particu-
lar MOS, probably because it was seen as a competitor sin-
ce it improved the forecasts as much as about ten years of 
model development. Even worse from the modellers’ point 
of view, to maintain a sufficiently large statistical sample of 
forecasts for the regression analysis the MOS meteorologists 
wanted to freeze the development of NWP, or at least main-
tain old version of NWP models. 
A way to circumvent this problem was to apply adaptive 
statistical interpretation schemes often with a Kalman filter 
as the basic tool. They were accepted by the NWP modellers 
but scared the forecasters because these automatic systems 
appeared to replicate experienced forecasters. 
3.3 Probability forecasting
Probability forecasting has by tradition been most successfu-
lly applied in North America where it figures in TV broadcasts as 
well as in newspapers. What is regarded as “difficult” in Euro-
pe does not seem to cause major problems “over there”. I do not 
think that Americans are more intelligent or better educated than 
Europeans, the only explanation must be that American public 
has been exposed to probability forecasts for longer times than 
the Europeans and, like the “chef du cuisine” at ECMWF, from 
their experience learned to link these probabilistic weather fo-
recasts with what subsequently occurred.
Instead of putting the blame on the public, “not unders-
tanding probabilities” I think we must ask ourselves if the 
problem with probabilities rather lies within the meteorolo-
gical community. 
3.4 tHe deterMinistic tradition in Meteorology
In a highly deterministic conjecture in”Essai philosophi-
que sur les probabilités” Pierre Simon Laplace invites us to re-
gard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past 
and the cause of its future:
« Une intelligence qui, à un instant donné, connaîtrait 
toutes les forces dont la nature est animée et la situation res-
pective des êtres qui la composent, si d’ailleurs elle était suffi-
samment vaste pour soumettre ces données à l’analyse, em-
brasserait dans la même formule les mouvements des plus 
grands corps de l’univers et ceux du plus léger atome ; rien 
ne serait incertain pour elle, et l’avenir, comme le passé, se-
rait présent à ses yeux.»2
This conjecture, often called “Laplace’s Demon”, has had 
a great resonance in classical mechanics of which dynamic 
meteorology is a branch. It has served as a great inspiration 
to many great Scandinavian meteorologists, from Vilhelm 
Bjerknes to Lennart Bengtsson. 
And why not? With an improvement of the ECMWF fore-
casts by about one day per decade, and no levelling out, the 
predictabilities looks like extending towards eternity. The pro-
gress is as exciting to follow as the voyage of one of the space 
probes leaving our solar system and heading for the nearest 
stars. In this sense the ECMWF great technological success 
story is comparable to other technological institutions like 
CERN, NASA and the Hubble Space telescope. Whereas the-
se institutions explore the limits of Micro cosmos or Macro 
cosmos the ECMWF explores the limits of determinism and 
the possible existence of Laplace’s Demon.
The back side has been that the detailed and confident 
looking ECMWF 10-day forecasts appeared to make ideas 
about uncertainty and probabilities redundant. Forecasters 
soon found that they could safely blindly follow the compu-
ter output: when it was correct they could take the credit, if it 
was wrong, they could put the blame on the ECMWF, which 
after all had the best and fastest computers! 
4. The history of ensemble 
forecasting
There has, however, always been one major “problem” 
with the ECMWF 10-day forecasts, their “jumpiness”.  Whi-
le it took five days to realise that a 5-day forecast was wrong, 
and by then most people had forgotten about it, within 12 
hours a previous forecast would appear to be wrong being 
contradicted by a later one.  This problem was brought to the 
fore by a group of Dutch meteorologists during a workshop 
at ECMWF in 1986: 
“The increasing sophistication of our professional custo-
mers makes it harder and harder to maintain our professio-
nal reputation. Our clients discover time and again that me-
dium-range forecasts suffer significant changes from one day 
to the next. …often enough a medium a medium-range fore-
cast is not consistent with the one issued the day before. Do 
we really want the public to become as cynical about wea-
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ther forecasts as many of us are about economic forecasts?” 
(Tennekes et al, 1986)
The Dutch group argued that “no forecast is complete wi-
thout a forecast of forecast skill” and that the time had come 
“to make skill forecasting one of the central goals of predicta-
bility research…it is a question of credibility. “
The problem of “forecast forecast skill” was subject to a lot 
of work at the ECMWF in the 1980’s. The main approach was 
to find a statistical relation between the skill of the most recent 
forecast “jumpiness” and different predictors related to the flow 
type and “jumpiness”. The aim was that a forecaster one day 
would be able to confidently base his/her outlook on the ECMWF 
high-resolution deterministic 10-day forecast system (HRES) up 
to say five days, the next day perhaps up to seven days. 
The “forecast forecast skill” work didn’t yield any useful 
results, because the problem was incorrectly posed. Any infor-
mation in the “jumpiness”, i.e. the spread of forecasts, should 
rather relate to the skill of the mean of these forecasts, than to 
any individual forecast.
With increasing computer capacity it was possible in 1992 
to apply a modified Monte Carlo technique to the problem. In 
brief: the initial analysis was randomly perturbed into an en-
semble of equally possible initial analyses. Each of these was 
run on a slightly coarser model version creating an ensemble 
of equally possible 10-day forecasts. This Ensemble Prediction 
System (ENS), has since the upgrade 1996 met all demands for 
effective medium range forecasts:
1 As a source of deterministic forecasts: The mean 
of the ensemble (EM) or the median of all the members 
would provide the least error estimation of a determi-
nistic forecast. The spread around the mean would in-
dicate its accuracy. A further advantage, and an im-
portant one, was that the EM was much less “jumpy” 
than the HRES.
2 As a source of probabilistic forecasts: The pro-
portion of ensemble forecasts within certain intervals 
or exceeding certain thresholds could be used to calcu-
late probabilities for these intervals or threshold. Calcu-
lations of combined probabilities would also be possible 
(e.g. for heavy rain and gale force winds). By relating 
the probabilities to their climatological values further 
insight could be reached.
3 Synoptic overview: By grouping together similar 
ensemble members into averages (clustering) the fore-
casters wouldn’t have to look at all the ensemble mem-
bers individually. With a limited number of clusters (≤ 
6) the forecasters could easily relate the probabilities to 
the forecast synoptic flow regimes.
This is, however, not how the ENS mainly has been 
used by operational meteorologists or promoted by the 
scientists and modellers.
1. the eM (or MediAn) As A provider 
of deterMinistiC foreCAsts:
1.1 1.1 the eM was from the start met with 
some apprehension by the eCMwf modellers. Knowing 
that its forecasts would be more accurate than the 
hres and much more stable it was of course seen as 
an unwanted competitor.
1.2 the probabilistic modellers feared that if the fo-
recasters used the eM they would feel so relieved from 
uncertainties and “jumpiness” they would loose inter-
est in probabilities.
1.3  since it only needed a dozen members to com-
pute a fair eM, not 30-50, the computer minded mo-
dellers saw a danger that an increased use of the eM 
could make it more difficult to motivate upgrades of 
the computer system.
1.4 the forecasters’ main education and experien-
ce in the short range, where frontal zones and barocli-
nic instabilities play important roles, made them unac-
customed to use the eM where these synoptic features 
had been smoothed out when the spread in the ensem-
ble had grown to a certain extent.3
1.5 the groups held these misgivings for themsel-
ves and united around the argument that the eM could 
not serve as a forecast since it, as an average, did not 
represent a physically possible state of the atmosphe-
re. this is true, but irrelevant since what we want is the 
most accurate deterministic forecast, not a nice illus-
tration to a meteorological textbook. 
1.6 Another argument was that in cases of bi-mo-
dality, i.e. two distinct flow regimes, the eM would be 
completely unrealistic, “between two stools”. bimo-
dality turned out to much less frequent than expected 
(see 3.1), but even in those cases it can be shown that 
the eM provides the “best estimate” for a determinis-
tic forecast.
1.7 it was also said that the eM averaging wrecked the 
physical consistency between different weather parame-
ters. that is also true, but has since long been the case 
also in deterministic models with respect to precipita-
3 Before 1980 medium range forecasters were quite accustomed to work with temporally and spatially averaged maps. It was on such maps that C G Rossby in 
the late 1930’s discovered “his” waves 
  
tion forecasts (accumulated values over a time interval) 
and for example cloud forecasts (instantaneous values).
1.8 those who favoured hres and not eM as the pro-
vider of deterministic forecasts information used the ar-
gument that hres was a “better model” thanks to its 
higher vertical and horizontal resolutions. this was in-
deed an issue the first 4-5 years but since then these mo-
del differences have mattered less and less. if the hres 
output today was secretly replaced by output from the de-
terministic ens Control few would notice any difference.
1.9 the promotion of hres to eM sometimes took 
parodical appearances. if the hres forecasts scored 
better than some other external model, it was said that 
“the eCMwf model is the best”. when the eM scored 
better than hres it was said to be “better at minimi-
zing the rMse (root mean square error)”.
2.probAbilities And spreAd:
Nor were probabilities high on the agenda when the ENS 
started in 1992. The main use of the ENS was seen to be in 
“forecasting the forecast skill”, the expected skill of the cu-
rrent deterministic HRES forecast. But not everybody was 
pleased with that. A manager from a meteorological institu-
tion put forward his view that “what we want is better fore-
casts, not some b***y index telling us how wrong they are!”
2.1 The “forecast forecast skill” approach is as problema-
tic when applied on ENs as is with lagged forecasts because 
the spread is related to the expected error of the EM, not to 
any individual forecast, whether from the hREs, ENs Control 
or any individual member.
2.2 The hREs-ENs model differences, which were empha-
sized in the provision of deterministic forecasts (see 1.6 abo-
ve) were now downplayed, to motivate the use of the ENs for 
measuring the a priori skill of the hREs.
2.3 Even if we regard hREs as a “better” model this is, at 
best, only true in the short range and its role as a simulator of 
atmosphere motion. The hREs’s ability to forecasts extremes 
slightly better than ENs Control is irrelevant due to both mo-
dels’ inability to provide certainty estimations. For the medium 
range forecasting, for which purpose the ECMWF was set up 
the ENs is therefore superior to both hREs and ENs Control. 
2.4 The safest way to use the ENs spread to estimate 
the a priori skill of the hREs is to do it only in cases with high 
predictability, when there is small spread and an overwhel-
ming majority of the members support the hREs. If the chan-
ce is 80% that a major hurricane will strike New York every-
body knows what has to be done, but can everybody feel safe 
when the risk is “only” 20%?
2.5 so far the ENs spread. Probabilities were, as mentio-
ned above, not high on the agenda in 1992 and became offi-
cially recognized by the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) 
only in 1995, perhaps to motivate the 1996 upgrade from 32 
to 50 members, an important requisite to calculate more re-
liable probabilities. until then only the Predictability and Met 
Ops sections had promoted the use of probabilities on training 
courses and Member sate visits..
2.6 One reason the TAC, and particular its chairman, was 
sceptical was because in their view probabilities could only be 
derived from MOs systems. The idea that probabilities could 
be calculated from the proportion of ENs members was ques-
tioned because how did we know that all members were equa-
lly likely, an argument already Laplace had to deal with. These 
misgivings often reflected controversy between frequentist and 
Bayesian statistical schools, going back 200 years (although 
none of us realised this at the time).
2.7 To use the spread information from a probabilistic sys-
tem to measure the accuracy, not of the EM, but of a single de-
terministic model, can lead to severe inconsistencies such as a 
hREs forecast of 17 m/s and from the ENs a 30% probabili-
ty for gales, or a 75% gale probability from the ENs when the 
hREs forecast has only 7 m/s.
In statistical theory the arithmetic mean is called the “first 
moment”, the variance (spread) the “second moment” and the 
skewness the “third moment”. The ENS probabilities therefore 
relate naturally to the EM - not to HRES or any individual model. 
If the first moment is swept under the carpet, it is of cour-
se difficult to become acquainted with the last two moments, 
which define probabilities. Consequently, we can discuss at 
lengths the usefulness of probabilities, but as long as the en-
semble mean or median is not in the picture, the probabili-
ties will, so to say, “hang freely in the air”.
The difficult to understand probabilities in forecasting 
meteorology is therefore made more difficult if fundamental 
relations in statistics are unknown or thwarted to suite poli-
tical group interests.
3. Clusters
Clusters can be made in an unlimited number of ways, 
every one with advantages and disadvantages. The one 
ECMWF decided on in 1992 made sure that the members wi-
thin a cluster were synoptically similar during the three days 
from D+4 to D+7. This clustering, as with any other algori-
thm, was originally meant only to be a way to get an overview 
of the ENS but early on it took a perhaps too important role.
3.1 university scientists hoped through the clustering to 
find support to a popular  hypothesis about “multiple equilibria” 
We meteorologists  
cannot escape probabilities!  
TIEMPO Y CLIMA   abril 2014  Nº 4442
  
asociación Meteorológica esPaÑola
43
in the atmospheric flow. But only occasionally did the cluste-
ring show bi- or tri-modality, i.e. synoptically two or three dis-
tinct flow patterns. Mostly there was a rather continuous chan-
ge from one cluster to the next.
3.2 The ECMWF clustering came early on under criticism 
when individual members, at a specific lead time, were found 
to be “outside” the cluster. In such cases a day-by-day clus-
tering would have been better, but on the other hand presen-
ted other problems.
3.3 some pedagogic images of the ENs easily gave the 
impression that the verifying Truth would always be found by 
the largest cluster. This might be the case when it contained > 
80% of the members, but not when it was < 20%.
3.4 Even if a more populated cluster was closer to the 
Truth it was smoother due to the averaging process. To the 
forecasters it therefore appeared less realistic than less popu-
lated clusters which for the opposite reason preserved more 
details and appeared “more realistic”, a problem similar to 
1.4 above.
3.5 To remedy this problem, the ECMWF has in their 
new clustering algorithm made the most typical member re-
present the cluster instead of the cluster average. This has, 
however, opened up for the misunderstanding, know from 
the psychological literature, that what looks “typical” also 
is more probable..
3.6 In a speech at ECMWF in december 2000 about the 
future of ECMWF the President of the Council and director of 
the german Weather service, udo gärtner wanted us to find out 
which one of the 50 ensemble members was “the best”. This 
is an application of the common “Model of the day” approach 
where forecasters faced with a multitude of NWP models try 
to find out which one to follow. 
3.7 A similar approach was already discussed in 1992, 
to use the clusters to judge which one of two successive, but 
“jumpy” hREs forecasts was the most likely – if any of them 
at all. Again, this is yet another attempt to try to escape pro-
babilities and find a deterministic forecast in the ENs.
To summarize: the use of probabilities from the ECMWF 
ensemble system has been hampered not only for the com-
monly quoted reason that “probabilities are difficult to un-
derstand” but also due to internal meteorological agendas and 
poor understanding of basic statistical concepts.
5. What to do?
Although there is, and has always been, a strong element 
of statistics in weather forecasting this has rarely been reflec-
ted in the curriculum. Here is an outline of a weekly course 
in probability theory, which starts from the three different 
definitions of probabilities:
MondAy: The classical definition of probability. This 
starts with the familiar illustration of tossing coins and dice, 
but move on to combinatoric which, among other things, will 
tell about the problems to add or divide probabilities. 
tuesdAy: The frequentist definition of probabilities. 
This involves verification of probability forecasts, mean and 
variance and significance. Why is it not possible to deceive 
the “proper” Brier score? How does it seem to “know” my 
true opinion?
wednesdAy:  The subjective definition of probabilities. 
From conditional probabilities (the chance of having rain if it 
is windy is normally not the same to have windy conditions 
if it rains. From Bayes’ Rule we move into several applica-
tions well known in forecasting meteorology.
thursdAy:  Decisions from probabilities. From the ele-
mentary cost-loss model, we move into more complex models 
such as the Kahneman-Twersky Propect theory. The value of 
total uncertainty will also be explored.
fridAy:  The psychology of probabilities. The commu-
nication of uncertainty does not totally depend on numerical 
values of probabilities. Verbal statements can function equa-
lly well as well as intervals with tacit probabilities.
The mathematics of probabilities is fairly simple, so the 
emphasis will be on the conceptual understanding.
6. summary
The introduction of the ENS in 1992 was seen as a paradigm 
shift in operational weather forecasting by introducing probabi-
lity forecasts. But probability forecasting had been around for 
almost 100 years, so perhaps the real paradigm shift was rather 
the introduction around 1980 of the ECMWF high-resolution 
deterministic 10-day forecast system (HRES) which gave the 
illusion about exact, confident and detailed weather forecasts. 
The weather forecasting problem remains, however, a pro-
babilistic matter, whether we “like” it or not. The question is 
to find ways to handle this problem waiting for the realiza-
tion of “Laplace Demon” in a very distant future. 
In the meantime we have to acknowledge uncertainty. It 
has been argued in this article that forecast uncertainty in-
formation is a win-win product: it increases the value of the 
forecast and it gives the forecasters opportunities to display 
their skill, experience and knowledge, which make people 
trust the forecasts. Because, as Alan Murphy used to empha-
size, even if a forecasts is very accurate with no uncertain-
ties, if it is not trusted, it will serve no purpose.
